



**Green Economy and Sustainable Development:
Bringing Back the Social Dimension
CONFERENCE**

**Conservation Capitalism: Native Amazonian
Regimes of Ownership and Market-Based
Rainforest Conservation**

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REDD+

‘Land-use change contributed to approximately 20% of global greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) during the period 1990-2000... in this context, incentivizing reductions in GHG emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, conserving and enhancing forest carbon stocks and sustainably managing forests (REDD+) have emerged as a key international strategy to halt land-use change in developing countries and involve them in climate change mitigation efforts. Essentially, REDD+ is expected to establish incentives for developing countries to protect and better manage their forest resources, by creating and recognising a financial value for the additional carbon stored in trees or not emitted to the atmosphere. Drawing on the contents of the Copenhagen Accord and the current progress under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), REDD+ is becoming one of the key pillars of a post-2012 international climate regime, particularly regarding developing country mitigation efforts’ (Corbera and Schoeder 2011: 89).

REDD+ governance

‘REDD+ is a governance process with multiple actors, interests and activities, involving several sources of formal and informal power and authority (UN bodies, multilateral organisations, governments, but also community and indigenous organisations), which all influence each other and may or may not coincide in their interests and vision regarding how such strategy [sic] of forest and climate governance should actually look like [sic] in the near future. REDD+ exemplifies how a scientifically informed policy idea (i.e. land-use change related emissions contribute significantly to climate change and biodiversity loss) permeates through multiple spheres of decision-making and organisation, creates contested interests and claims, and translates into multiple implementation actions running ahead of policy processes and state-driven decisions’ (Corbera and Schroeder 2011: 90).

MRV

‘...with REDD+ looking increasingly likely to become operational in the coming years, there is significant demand for monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) best practice, holistically including carbon, biodiversity, social, and ecosystem service monitoring (this four pronged monitoring approach is extrapolated from the current details in the UNFCCC REDD+ draft paper under the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long Term Cooperative Action (AWC-LCA)(UNFCCC 2009)’ (Palmer Fry 2011: 182).

Community MRV

‘the community consents to the REDD+ project after extensive consultation; the community itself then plans the monitoring programme with the assistance of an external expert, and a REDD+ contract is created that fulfils local and high level policy demands; the forest monitors are elected by the community from a subgroup nominated by the expert, trained, and carry out the agreed monitoring activities that encompass carbon, biodiversity, social impacts and ecosystem services; payments are given out at a flat rate for providing the information (instead of linking them to carbon stocks as conflict may arise due to natural variance in forest carbon, and so payments (Skutsch et al., 2009)); and finally this data is collected and fed into the local management system as well as the higher level institutional framework on an annual basis, in so integrating the local information into regionally/nationally co-ordinated strategic forest cover monitoring (Palmer Fry 2011: 185).

Monitoring governance

‘A final addition to this monitoring paradigm might be that suggested by [Global Witness \(2009a,2009b\)](#) – an independent and expert monitoring body, assembled by a local partner, that primarily looks at implementation of policy and regulations, in so combating the commonplace “weak governance, corruption, high levels of illegality and poor forest law enforcement” in forest-rich developing nations. This would also be capable of verifying the information provided by the community and so eliminating the credibility issues associated with unregulated self-monitoring... There is also a need to explore the previously untapped potential of locally based monitoring to track social impacts (which will be a central MRV requirement in a REDD+ programme)’ (Palmer Fry 2011: 185).

Suriname's Indigenous organisation demands participation:

‘The R-PIN [Readiness Plan Idea Note, a report on the Readiness preparations so far, submitted to the UN by the Surinamese government] further states that “Dialogue with wider circles of relevant stakeholders, including representatives of the Maroon and Indigenous peoples, will take place in the next phases, i.e. during project preparation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.” This is not acceptable: consultation cannot be meaningful after the Government has unilaterally pre-determined the parameters for the discussion. Also, we are not stakeholders, but rights-holders, and we fully expect to be treated as such in relation to the FCPF [Forest Carbon Partnership Facility], especially as the FCPF Charter requires respect for our rights.’ (Pané and Edwards 2009).

I) How do legal land ownership and the concept of carbon trading appear from an Amerindian perspective?

II) indigenous concepts of space and time, mapping, calculation of delayed benefits, and monitoring

III) Money

'Sustainable' carbon-related development

‘The community is aware that nature is changing and blame [sic] observed climate changes on disrespectful ways of living with the forest. The Trios possess insufficient western knowledge to understand the mechanics and opportunities of carbon-based conservation. However, conservation and acquiring land rights are high priorities for the Trios... Trios have always been open to receiving monies for purchasing western goods, e.g., sugar, salt, and batteries. Western goods are seen as a status symbol. Projects are therefore seen as opportunities to create wage labor for more Trios to improve their status’ (Smith 2010: 5, my emphasis).